Volume 42
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 42,
1937-1938
6-1-1938

The Judiciary Under the Constitution
John W. Kephart

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
John W. Kephart, The Judiciary Under the Constitution, 42 DICK. L. REV. 171 (1938).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol42/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
VOLUME XLII

JUNE, 1938

NUMBER 4

THE JUDICIARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
John W. Kephart*
We are now commemorating the 150th Anniversary of our Constitution.
It is fitting and truly appropriate that this College mark that great event today

because two of our men signed that document, John Dickinson and James
Wilson. They were both among the honored founders of this institution. John
Dickinson was the first president of our Trustees and James Wilson served as
one of the original members of that Board.
This country has now experienced 150 years under the Constitution. At
such a time it is proper to pause and evaluate the results achieved under the
structure so established, and to pass critical judgment upon the modus operandi
There is little doubt that these reflections lead to the
of our government.
conclusion that if there are any structural factors to which our government owes
its longevity, vitality and security, they are the basic tripartite division of its
functions, and the separation of its component powers.
When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia to replace the
Articles of Confederation with a lasting compact to assure national cohesion
and establish a democratic state that would endure, there were many conflicting
theories abroad regarding the distribution of governmental powers. One theory
was that of executive absolutism, under which the executive made the laws and
enforced them; the legislative power served simply in an advisory capacity to
the executive; the judiciary, merely as its agency of enforcement. The great
monarchies of Europe were so constituted. The king or prince made the laws
by divine right. His parliament or council were not the representatives of the
people but his advisors. The judges were merely his delegates. He appointed
and removed them at will. Their sole function was to sit for the king in
his courts to dispense his justice. The judges of the King's Bench were
hand-picked royal favorites. The chancellor, presiding over the royal courts of
equity, was the keeper of the King's conscience. Justice was the whim of the
monarch. Political offenders were tried and condemned in star chambers. One
;Address by Honorable John W. Kephart, Chief Justice Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
delivered at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, cn Fo:n,!ers Day. April 30, 1938.
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of the greatest English jurists, Lord Coke, boldly protested this judicial subservience. He staked life and career upon his famous dispute with James the
First, who demanded the right to try capital cases without the aid of his
judges. Coke won for the English courts a limited freedom, but even today
they are not entirely divorced from, nor independent of, the other branches of
government. The judges are appointed by the Crown, and removed by the
Crown upon the address of Parliament. Parliament is the final court of appeal.
On the continent of Europe, in similar fashion, the doctrine of the divine right
of kings produced a servile judiciary, creatures of the will of the executive.
Another theory of government, often attributed to the fertile brain of John
Locke, is that of legislative supremacy. It was the outgrowth of the long
struggle between kings and parliaments; between the will of an absolute monarch and the will of a popular assembly. In the great reaction against the evil
of autocracy, many philosophers and political economists believed that the legislative should dominate both the executive and the judiciary. By this doctrine
the courts and the executive were but arms of the legislature, the law-making
body. Their sole function was the articulation and enforcement of the legislative will. So long as the legislators were chosen by the people and subject to
recall, the theory represented an advance in government. But once the legislators assumed to themselves the right of self-perpetuation and independence of
recall, the tyranny and despotism was no less. This theory, however, found
many adherents in the convention of American statesmen to whom the people
had entrusted the delicate task of creating a stable, popular government.
There was still a third theory, a theory first enunciated by the French
philosopher Montesquieu in his Spirit of Laws, as yet untried in practical government. This was the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the placing
of the judiciary upon an equal footing with the other branches of government.
Montesquieu said: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the
judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."
The founders of our Nation desired neither executive nor legislative absolutism. They desired limitations upon the positive powers of each of these
departments to avoid their ultimate merger and the destruction of constitutional democracy. Montesquieu's doctrine was the only one which could accomplish their purpose. Whilt the framers of the Constitution realized that
the powers could never be completely isolated because they are all, by their very
nature, interdependent, they drew a clear line of demarcation between them.
Thus three great component elements formed the structure of the newlycreated nation's governmental scheme - the legislative, the executive and the
the legislative power to make the laws by which the State is
judiciary -
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governed; the judicial power to interpret them and apply them to the lives
of the people, determining within legislative limits, the penalties for disobedience; the executive power to execute and enforce the laws. Each power
stood and stands upon an equal plane. Each is, within its proper sphere, independent of the others.
The position of our judiciary under the Constitution was and is unique in
history. The equality it shares with the other branches of government, its
complete independence, found and finds no counterpart in other countries.
While fear of the other two branches of government played a large part in
persuading the framers of our Constitution to elevate the judiciary to a position
of equal governing power, there was a more important reason for placing in it
this trust. The judiciary had the confidence of the people through the courts,
bred of close, long and intimate association. The colonial judge knew the
persons who came before him; he had known their families and their backgrounds; they knew his. They mingled on the streets, in places of business and
in places of worship. Thus there was present a confidence in the courts and
an understanding and sympathy between the judiciary and the people. And
thus, albeit the heat of contemporary political philosophies and controversies,
there was fused between the judiciary and the people the lifeblood of American
democracy.
In those early days it was regarded an eventful occasion to go to court, to
see the justice of the peace, as a judge, on the bench, hear the witnesses, and,
when the jury system was evolved, the addresses to the jury-generally by
laymen for there were few lawyers-and finally the verdict and the judgment.
This occurrence, repeated often in a community, permitted the judge to grow
into the confidence of his people. He was their judge, and to his door people
in distress would often go for advice. He became more intimately associated
with their life than the Governor or any member of the executive or legislative departments of the government. He became a greater factor for peace,
order and good government than any other factor could be. Then, too, these
officers performed certain administrative functions, many of which were of a
quasi-judicial nature. When the law judges, as such, were introduced, with
their higher dignity, they took up much of the work of the justices of the
peace, but with the same constant intercourse with the common people. They
formed in reality a governing force built up partly by law and partly through
common consent.
As the colonies grew in population so did the courts in power and influence. It is little wonder therefore that in providing a check to the legislative
and executive branches of government, the framers of the Constitution depended
upon the judicial agency for that purpose, knowing that in it they had a fullfunctioning governmental force, one that understood the people's hopes, their
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aspirations and life; one that stood close to the people and in whom the people
placed their trust; one that could be depended on to be responsive to the
people's will as expressed in the Constitution. The framers could have adopted other means of checks and balances, or reposed that power in the several
States. When the judiciary was selected and elevated to its high function as
a coordinate branch of government, the courts which exercised a powerful
influence on the life of the citizens of the young Republic, accepted a sacred
trust to preserve liberty.
As might be expected, the courts were at first timid to assert the right to
take it upon themselves to preserve the separation of governmental powers.
Having come a long way through the centuries to their new position of power,
how should the judiciary respond to the people's will? How should they proceed in deference to the basic idea that gave birth to their power and encouraged its growth? The courts felt circumscribed by an inherent weakness-the
inability to enforce their decrees against an unwilling executive or an unyielding
legislative body. Many of the pioneer American jurists feared such efforts
would be met, not only with defiance, but with the destruction of the independence of the judiciary. In 1780, the highest court of New Jersey made the
great experiment. It declared void an act impinging the constitutional right of
trial by jury. The precedent provoked mingled reactions. They insisted that
each department of government was the sole judge of its own constitutional
limitations. Even our learned Chief Justice Gibson maintained this view until,
in 1795, the Supreme Court of our State followed the New Jersey precedenr.
It was not until 1803 that the Supreme Court of the United States declared
its power to strike down acts of Congress which violated the Constitution.
The great Chief Justice, John Marshall, met executive defiance and legislative
reproach for his fearless pronouncement of the doctrine. Many times during
the history of our nation it has been subjected to challenge. Yet there has
always been popular support of the courts in the exercise of this prerogative.
Only recently we have seen the entire force of public opinion rally to prevent
its abridgement. Through the exercise of this power our judiciary has passed
from sterile inferiority in the governmental function to a position equal to the
other branches, with equal duties in its own sphere and equal responsibilities
in the fabric of government.
Today the position of the judiciary in America is as unique in the world as
it was 150 years ago. It has come down the stream of time freighted with the
precious cargo of democracy and stands in sharp relief when compared with
the servile judiciaries of nations now in the grasp of dictatorship.
Why?
The answer can be found in the continuance of the very factors which gave
birth to an independent and equal American judiciary. The people today, as
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in colonial times, fear the tyranny of an unrestrained executive or legislative
branch. The judiciary today still maintains a closeness to the people and a
sympathy for its desires. A charted course of judicial decisions will indicate
that law is not and has not been immutable, or immune from the contemporary
economic and social needs of the people.
Today more than ever, the contact of the judiciary with the common
people is a startling yet gratifying fact. This is not because people are litigious,
but because in the courts they find satisfactory answers to many of their serious
problems; the courts guide and control from birth to death; from cases involving
adoption to cases involving inheritance taxes; from cases involving the living
to cases concerning the dead.
An excellent illustration is furnished by a brief analysis of the cases that
came before the Philadelphia Courts in the year 1936. In that city of 2,000,000
people, in that year alone there was a total of 98,979 lawsuits and matters for
legal determination which passed before courts of record; there were 27,366
cases before the Court of Common Pleas; 7,447 before the Orphans' Court;
11,733 criminal prosecutions, from the smallest breach of the peace to murder,
were brought into the Courts of Quarter Sessions and Oyer and Terminer. The
same court disposed of 844 other legal matters, not criminal in nature. In the
Municipal Court, 51,589 suits of every description were decided, in the Domestic Relations, Civil, Criminal, Juvenile and Small Claims Divisions. Imagine
if you will the number of persons that passed before the Judges. In each case
there were at least two parties, in most of them, many more. In one single case
before the Orphans' Court there were 23,000 claimants. In addition to thz
parties to the lawsuits, there are those whose interests are vitally affected
by the decision of the courts; relatives of the parties, creditors and dependents
of the litigants. To all these must be added the vast army of persons who participate in the trial - the witnesses and the jurors who sit in judgment. Day
in and day out the courtrooms echo with the outpourings of every human
emotion. Love and greed, jealousy and hatred, passion and ingratitude, envy
and hope, sorrow and joy, all are laid bare in stark realism before the judge.
Spectators throng the courts, interested, curious, anxious. Think, for a moment,
how many lives are touched in but one city, in one single year, by the judicial
function! Yet staggering though this thought may be, we must multiply our illustration by the number of the courts in the cities and counties of the nation to understand the place of the judiciary in American life. What you now see is
what the framers of the Constitution saw when that document was written,
though in a ratio comparable to the population-then less than four millionnow more than one hundred and twenty million - a free and untrammelled
judiciary-in whom the people could and did put their trust.
The responsibility of the courts has been great, and its fulfillment has, at
times, subjected them to criticism and abuse. But the regard of the American
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people and their confidence in the judiciary has grown steadily. Had the judiciary
yielded to every voice that bade them ignore the tenets of the Constitution, our
democratic form of government would have inevitably been destroyed.
We have seen in other lands the evils of unbridled power centered in one
man or one party. We have seen the enslavement and persecution of racial and
religious minorities. We have seen the inalienable rights of freemen surrendered
to the popularity of dictatorship. It was to protect us from this that our forefathers drew the Constitution. For this self-same reason the courts have steadfastly declared their equality and freedom in the role of government. As I had
occasion to remark a few years ago "The Constitution was itself a strange concept of government to be hurled into a world of despotism and absolutism.
Though its life was predicted to be short, it has stood the test of time and has
guided our country through disheartening political and social conflicts. With
knowledge of the past, with fear for the present and with hope for the future,
the Constitution was created of vital, living principles, hopes and desires. It must
not be considered a dead instrument, with the inert hand of the past reaching
into the future, pressing hard to impede progress and thwart advancement. It
is a living instrument, growing with time and extending its beneficent influence
into a changing world so that we, who live under it, may partake of its blessings.
It must not be restrained nor restricted by the judiciary in rigid and unyielding
shackles of interpretation, but must be left free by the tolerant interpretation
intended for it by its framers, so that its inspired purpose may continue to be
fulfilled. With such an approach to its articles, our Constitution will continue
to safeguard the Republic, and the bedrock of the true liberty it created will not
be disturbed. We need have no fear for the Constitution while its great
underlying structure is left intact and untouched."
The three governmental departments together form the mighty arch of our
Republican system. The legislative and executive are the great arcs, joined,
yet separated by the keystone. The judiciary is that keystone. So long as
it stands, the entire structure will stand. When it is removed, the structure
will fall.
Secure in the confidence of the people, enshrined in their hearts, the
courts of America have grown powerful beyond the dreams of Montesquieu
and Coke. So long as they do not abuse that power, so long as they faithfully
protect and defend the Constitution, holding themselves within its limitations
on their own authority, America, under the Constitution, need not fear the
future.
The Constitution must, and will, live as an organism devoted to the
best and truest ideals of society. Its benefits must be for all the people, not
for a few to wrap its folds about them and declare its protection for their own
selfish interests or purposes. Its beneficent aims and purposes are for all
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mankind within its encircling grasp, and its enlightened process is such that
it may helpfully minister to all within the ever changing scope of human
endeavor. Let us keep it so.
Ebensburg,Pa.

John W. Kephart.

